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The United States has much more punishment than the 
countries to which we would like to compare ourselves, and also 
much more crime. We are back to about 1965 crime levels, 
which is a considerable accomplishment. It means we are at 
about half the crime rate we were in 1994. But we still have 
four times as many homicides as any civilized country, and in 
the same neighborhoods where a large fraction of the young 
men wind up in prison or on probation, the leading cause of 
death for young men is being murdered. It is important not to 
lose sight of the crime side of the crime-and-punishment prob-
lem. They are both rather nightmarish. 
Most of the harm done by crime is not the direct result of 
victimization, but of all the efforts that people make to avoid 
being victimized, starting with moving to the suburbs. I have 
not seen any discussion of crime as a contributor to global 
warming, but if suburban and exurban sprawl is a major source 
of green house gas emissions, crime and the consequent mobili-
ty patterns make a big contribution to sprawl.  
So: we have crime and we have punishment. Punishment is 
supposed to control crime through deterrence, incapacitation, 
and rehabilitation, as well as providing retribution (which I re-
gard as a proper objective).  
The default punishment in the current American system is 
incarceration. We talk about other punishments as “alterna-
tives to incarceration.” Empirically, that is not correct; most 
people who get convicted of something are not sent to prison or 
jail, but instead are placed under community supervision.  
I would add pretrial release to the list of community super-
vision statuses we need to pay attention to. Pretrial release has 
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a very large number of people on it at any one time, and an 
even larger number of people going through it over time. Ten 
percent of new felonies are people currently on release awaiting 
trial for something else. Managing pretrial release is a problem 
we have not even started to wrestle with. 
Locking people up is a pretty good way to incapacitate 
them, as long as you ignore the crimes they commit against one 
another and the crimes committed against them by officials 
while they are in prison, which we should, but do not, count. 
Incarceration does provide the maximum retribution—
particularly the way we run some of our prisons in this country. 
On the other hand, if incarceration makes a contribution to re-
habilitation, nobody has ever found it. 
Consider ways of treating offenders other than by locking 
them up. What are the desiderata of such a system—of any 
punishment system?  
Punishment ought to be frontloaded because offenders, 
even more than the rest of us, tend to be somewhat present-
oriented. So the closer the punishment is to the crime, the more 
effect it is going to have on future behavior. That implies that 
our current system of back-loaded punishments, where the of-
fender still feels the effects of having committed a crime at 
eighteen when he is thirty-five, is completely crazy. The ideal 
punishment hits right away and dissipates quickly. 
Punishment should be arranged so that, once it ends, the 
offender finds that choosing a law-abiding life from there on out 
is more advantageous than continuing to commit crimes. That 
suggests that fines are a really terrible idea for people who are 
committing crimes to get money, and that any kind of disability 
in the labor market is another really terrible idea, insofar as it 
pushes the people we would like to make into ex-offenders back 
toward criminal activity. 
The obvious alternative to incarceration is community re-
lease under supervision. But, as Marty Horn has pointed out, 
there is another alternative sentence of considerable antiquity: 
“Go, and sin no more.”
1
 There is no particular reason to think 
that every conviction ought to lead to a substantial punish-
ment; insofar as probation is merely being used as a placehold-
er because we do not want to do anything else, maybe we ought 
to think about cutting back on it. For a very large fraction of 
the people who are nominally under probation supervision but 
are considered “low-risk,” that supervision is in fact only nomi-
 
 1. John 8:11. 
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nal. They are on banked caseloads where all that is being man-
aged is the paperwork, and basically nothing happens unless 
they commit another crime. For that group, “probation” is a le-
gal status rather than a program. It simply means that a new 
offense can be handled through probation revocation, which is 
faster than bringing a new case.  
However, on paper even those merely-nominal probation-
ers are subject to a long list of conditions of release. It is merely 
that we do not bother to monitor whether those conditions are 
being observed. If you think, as I do, that bluffing is a bad habit 
and that the criminal justice system does way too much of it, 
then you ought to favor making the distinction between nomi-
nal and real probation explicit, and not pretend to impose con-
ditions we are not willing to enforce. 
As Ron Corbett has pointed out,
2
 even for those on “real” 
probation, there is a practical limit to the number of conditions 
that can be usefully imposed, simply based on the mental 
“bandwidth” of probationers. We routinely exceed that limit. 
Probation conditions compete for scarce cognitive capacity not 
only with each other but also with other things we want proba-
tioners thinking about, such as finding a job. To misquote Tho-
reau, “Let your conditions be as two or three, not as a hundred 
or a thousand.”
3
 Less is more. 
In addition to “not too many,” I would propose two other 
guiding principles about conditions of community corrections.  
Every condition should be linked to not committing new 
crimes, and any condition worth imposing is worth monitoring 
and enforcing with consequences—otherwise, it is just a helpful 
hint. There is no point giving orders if you cannot tell whether 
they are being obeyed or if you are not prepared to sanction 
disobedience. 
Now we get into this Symposium’s topic. There is a right 
way and a wrong way to do those sanctions. The wrong way is 
the way we do it now in almost all jurisdictions in this country. 
Monitoring is lax, partly because probation officers are over-
whelmed. A typical caseload in a high-crime jurisdiction will 
run between 150 and 200 cases: the arithmetic about how much 
time that leaves to supervise each case is grim. So monitoring 
is lax, and the probability that any given violation is detected is 
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approaching epsilon.  
When a violation is detected, the overworked probation of-
ficer (PO) is likely to say, “Don’t do that again.” That is proba-
bly the sanctions for more than ninety percent of detected pro-
bation violations. The second time he detects a violation, the 
PO is likely to say, “Don’t do that again.” The third time, “If 
you keep doing that, you’re going to get in trouble.” The fourth 
time, “You know, you do that one more time, we’re going to see 
the judge.” The fifth time, “This is your last chance.” 
Now, think about this as a system for shaping somebody’s 
behavior. The offender always knows that the next violation 
might draw an actual sanction, but never knows that the next 
violation will draw an actual sanction—how is he to guess 
which “last chance” is actually his last chance? When the PO 
finally loses his temper and takes the probationer in front of 
the judge, the judge has two options. The judge either says, 
“Don’t do that again. Really!,” in which case the probation of-
ficer’s credibility is shot, or sends the offender to (or back to) 
prison for a period of months or occasionally even years. So we 
have a system that never gives the probationer knowledge 
about the consequence of his behavior. It is a behavioral trap, 
setting up a revolving door.  
That has to be the wrong way to do the job. 
As for the right way, Cesare Beccaria wrote down the prin-
ciples in 1764.
4
 Punishments, to be effective, need to be swift 
and certain. They need not be severe. And as James Q. Wilson 
argued, severity is not merely an inadequate substitute for 
swiftness and certainty—it is the enemy of swiftness and cer-
tainty.
5
 And the more severe a sanction is, the more infrequent-
ly it can be applied because you run into capacity constraints 
and the more slowly it will be applied because you run into a 
higher standard of due process.  
So the right way involves swiftness, certainty, and (I would 
stress, as I failed to stress in the past) fairness. The best clini-
cal approach to changing somebody’s behavior minimizes, ra-
ther than maximizes, discretion in the probation officer and the 
judge. What is really therapeutic is the subject’s belief that his 
outcomes are tightly coupled to his behavior. 
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tion (Marion Inst., Working Paper No. 11, 2014), available at http:// 
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Insofar as punishment is discretionary, then the proba-
tioner is always given the choice of hoping to get away with it, 
and a lot of people who end up on probation have been hoping 
to get away with it for a long time. Moreover, if punishment is 
sporadic, as it generally is, then any actual punishment is real-
ly the decision of the probation officer or the judge. If punish-
ment is, instead, consistent and predictable, that makes the 
punishment implicit in the decision of the offender to break the 
rule. And that is the message you want the offender to get. 
So you want to put as many people as possible under com-
munity supervision rather than locking them up, you want to 
have no actual conditions of supervision for some offenders and 
a minimal number for the rest, and you want to enforce those 
conditions with swift, certain, and fair sanctions. That is the 
idea that went into Project HOPE and many, many other in-
stances, both before and after, of doing community supervision 
according to common sense principles known to every Psych 
101 professor and every parent. There is really nothing very 
obscure about this. This is just applying to the problem of 
community supervision everything we know about human be-
havior and how it changes.  
The hard part is the operations. I am convinced, based on 
what is now ample data (which Angela Hawken has done much 
of the work to collect and analyze), that wherever you put swift, 
certain, and fair sanctions into practice, you will get the same 
fairly sharp decay curve for violation rates—a big majority ei-
ther never violates or does so only once, and fewer than twenty 
percent violate as many as four times. 
There is an old saying about an incorrigible thief: “He’d 
steal a hot stove.” The principle of a project like HOPE—of 
swift, certain, fair sanctioning—is that most people will not 
steal a hot stove, that if you can make the stove reliably hot 
and make sure the person knows the stove is hot, most people 
will let it alone. 
What we found in Hawaii in a set of persistently noncom-
pliant probationers—most of them with methamphetamine 
problems and an average of fourteen prior arrests, picked pre-
cisely because they had not been complying with probation con-
ditions—is that once Judge Alm warned them that every de-
tected violation would lead to a couple days in jail and put them 
on random drug testing so there was no day they could safely 
use, half of those people never earned an actual sanction. So 
half the people you thought you were going to have to do some-
thing complicated to, you could pretty much ignore, once you 
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had given them a clear warning and made sure they knew you 
meant it. 
Hawken points to another feature of the swift-certain-fair 
approach, a result she calls “behavioral triage.” It causes proba-
tioners to divide themselves into a small group that needs ac-
tive supervision (demonstrated by persistent noncompliance) 
and a larger group that needs a good leaving-alone. And the 
system arranges for the good being left alone. Unlike a drug 
court judge, Steve Alm never sees a HOPE probationer after 
the warning hearing, unless that person violates, until it is 
time for the motion for early termination of probation. There-
fore, according to Hawken’s analysis, he spends an average of 
twenty courtroom minutes a year per HOPE probationer, which 
means he can handle his current load of 1900 probationers in a 
single courtroom, with only a usual judge’s staff. 
Compare that ratio—1900 probationers to one judge—to a 
drug court judge, who maxes out at fifty or seventy-five. So this 
is a program and an approach to probation management that 
can go to scale.  
The difficulties are operational, rooted in the complexity of 
the criminal justice system rather than the supposedly intrac-
table nature of addiction. You have to get probation officers to 
think about a different way of doing their job, and you have to 
think about making that new job feasible. If a violation report 
is a revocation motion that takes four hours to write up, and a 
probation officer has a caseload of 180 with a violation rate of 
about thirty percent a month for either no-shows or positive 
drug tests, which is typical, then the task of reporting every vi-
olation simply is not feasible. There are not that many hours in 
the work month. 
But if the report is simply, “The guy didn’t show up for his 
drug test yesterday,” that should not take four hours to fill out. 
So you simplify the paperwork. You have the report submitted 
by fax. You do not require the PO to show up for the hearing, 
which is, after all, a pretty perfunctory process. The guy did not 
show up for his drug test yesterday. What is he going to say 
about that? So you can simplify the workload. 
But even once you have done that, just as you need to 
watch the probationers closely, you need to watch the probation 
officers closely. They have personal relationships with their 
probationers. Confronted with a positive drug test, a PO is 
tempted to say, “This guy has been doing a good job for six 
months. All right, he screwed up once. Why shouldn’t I give 
him a break? He’s a good guy. He won’t do it again.”  
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That act of random mercy is toxic. Once that word gets 
around, everybody who actually gets punished will say, “Hey, 
why me? You didn’t punish him.” And when that guy is pun-
ished the next time, he will say, “Oh, you know, the PO must 
have been in a bad mood today. He is punishing me now for 
something I have done before and gotten away with, and that I 
know other people get away with. It’s not fair.” 
It is a paradox, but the mechanical aspect of swift, certain, 
fair sanctioning is one way the fairness gets built in.  
But you cannot get that sort of consistency in a bureaucrat-
ic setting unless you enforce it. Probation supervisors need to 
know which violations were detected and which were promptly 
and correctly acted on. And, again, you can develop a system to 
do that. 
The reason this is feasible is, again, that most people will 
not steal a hot stove. So of those first thirty-five really-bad-
actor HOPE probationers, seventeen never drew a sanction. 
And of the eighteen who drew a first sanction, nine never drew 
a second sanction. And by the time you get to a third sanction, 
you are down to fifteen percent of the population. If you are on-
ly dealing with fifteen percent of the population, you can really 
do some serious supervision and offer some intensive, high-
quality treatment and other services. Statistical prediction—
“risk-needs assessment”—is better than nothing, but it is not as 
good as the actual observation of behavior in deciding who real-
ly needs services and who really needs supervision.  
And the outcomes? Nothing short of spectacular: roughly 
fifty percent reductions in reoffending and in days behind bars 
over the next five years. The effects seem to persist beyond the 
supervision term, which is impressive. 
There is no reason we cannot do this on parole—
Washington State is doing it now for thousands of parolees. 
There is no reason we cannot do this on pretrial release, which 
was the first application of swift-certain-fair in Washington, 
D.C., in the 1970s.  
And there is no reason we cannot do it to a large number of 
people who are now in prison. I think we could make communi-
ty supervision a much more effective alternative to incarcera-
tion and make incarceration the last gasp where there is no 
other alternative. And I have to respectfully disagree with the 
notion that emptying most of the prisons by doing better com-
munity supervision would not be much progress over the status 
quo. I think it would be enormous progress. And I think we can 
do it while keeping crime rates moving in the right direction.  
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We are back to 1965 crime rates. Good for us! Incarceration 
peaked about two years ago and new commitments peaked 
about six years ago. Good for us! But, that leaves us with five 
times the incarceration rate we have ever had historically. In 
the eighty years up until 1979, the incarceration rate in this 
country varied between 120 and 140 prisoners, prison plus jail, 
per 100,000 residents. That number is now 752. We must not 
regard that sharp increase as normal or acceptable.  
To get back to our historical rate, we have to reduce the 
prison-plus-jail head count by eighty percent. That would mere-
ly leave our incarceration rate fifty percent higher than the av-
erage level of the advanced democracies. Most Western Euro-
pean countries run about 100. The only one that is even close to 
our historical rate is England and Wales, which runs about 
140. The Netherlands and Norway run about seventy. Now, 
there are lots of other things about those countries that are go-
ing to give them naturally lower crime rates, so we cannot nec-
essarily expect to get to their incarceration rate. But to get 
back to our own historical level, we have to figure out what to 
do with eighty percent of our current prisoners. 
To some extent, we can fix that on the back end. Swift-
certain-fair is one way to break the revolving door between 
community supervision and incarceration. We can do it some on 
the front end if we make probation and parole a more potent 
punishment. We may be able to persuade prosecutors, judges, 
and legislators to use incarceration less and community super-
vision more. But at some point we have to start letting people 
out of prison, and I think it is possible using the principles of 
swift-certain-fair management to control a very large fraction 
of our current prison and jail population, without holding them 
in cages and paying their room and board bill. 
So that is my current project: inventing a virtual prison 
where people would have a prisoner status but physically be in 
the community. (Think of it as furlough on steroids, or a half-
way house without the house but with a ton of information 
technology.) But that is a topic for another day. Our topic for 
today is whether we can get rid of a community-corrections sys-
tem that makes absolutely no sense because of too many condi-
tions, too loose monitoring, and sporadic but draconian pun-
ishment—that is the incumbent we are running against—and 
replace it with a system that any parent would figure out in 
two minutes—a limited number of rules, capacity to monitor 
every rule so there is no undetected violation, and a sanctioning 
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system so that there is no violation without a swift and modest 
punishment.  
I think it is now fair to say that we know that. But there is 
much we do not yet know. 
When HOPE started, Judge Alm was doing one week as 
the first sanction. My one contribution to this process was to 
say, “Try two days.” It turned out two days had exactly the 
same behavioral consequences as a week, or as the six weeks 
another judge was using. So we know that two days is enough 
in a system where there is escalating punishment with repeat-
ed violations. And when Judge Alm stopped escalating, he kept 
getting the same results. So we know that two days is enough 
even without escalation.  
We do not know whether two days is more than enough. 
The Sobriety 24/7 drunk driving program in South Dakota uses 
a night in a jail cell and gets spectacular results. And in one 
county, they ran out of jail cells and substituted one hour in a 
police holding cell as the first sanction and got the very same 
results. 
We are looking for the minimum effective dose of punish-
ment, and all that can be said for sure right now is we have not 
gone that low yet. The optimal first punishment might not be 
confinement in an institution at all. It might be a week on a 
curfew. It might be a weekend of home confinement. In Wash-
ington State, it is a “stipulated agreement”—basically a confes-
sion of the violation and a performance contract specifying 
sanctions for future violations. And that generates the same vi-
olation curve as HOPE gets—lots of zeroes, lots of ones, not 
many threes or fours. 
Swift-certain-fair, applied throughout the system, can 
massively reduce the number of people under lock and key 
while still reminding them not to do what they did before and 
still guiding them on a path that will not put them through the 
revolving door of crime and prison and crime and prison: “Do-
ing life on the installment plan.” That is a pattern we need to 
break. I think we can. 
